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NOTES
Civil Procedure: Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.:
An Analysis of Rule 11 and Its Appropriate
Standard of Review
One of the most intriguing issues currently confronting practicing attorneys concerns the use of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP).' Since 1983, a growing number of cases reporting sanctions arising
under rule 11 have been handed down from the federal bench to unwary
litigants. 2 The legal community has become concerned that federal judges
have tried to expand the rule by using it to keep certain claims out of the
federal courtrooms to control an ever increasing demand for docket-space.'
In the summer of 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx.4 Cooter & Gell held that in the event a litigant properly
dismisses a claim under rule 41(a)(1) of the FRCP,5 rule 11 sanctions would
be proper if the claim had originally been frivolously brought or was found
to have a dilatory purpose.6 In addition, the Court held that the proper
standard of review of a rule 11 sanction for appellate courts is the abuse
of discretion standard - one of the most difficult standards for an appellant

1. Rule 11 states, in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name, whose address shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
the cost of litigation ....
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 11 (as amended).
2. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
3. Solovy, The Cost of Rule 11 - Is It the Death Knell of Our Adversary System or the
Salvation of Our Courts?, COMPLEAT LAW., Spring 1990, at 27-30.
4. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
5. Rule 41 states, in pertinent part: "[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court (i) by filing notice of the dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs .... ." FED.
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
6. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2464.
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to overcome. 7 The holdings of this case send a clear message to potential
federal court litigants to properly investigate and carefully consider their
case prior to filing a claim.
This note will discuss the development of the law regarding rule 11 and
the standard of review used by federal appellate courts to check the appropriateness of rule 11 sanctions handed down from district courts. The note
will then analyze the Court's rationale in Cooter & Gell and will examine
the case's potential effects upon future rule 11 decisions.
I. Development of the Law Regarding Rule 11 and Rule 41(a)(1)
The Rules Enabling Act,8 passed by Congress in 1934, directed the Supreme Court to devise a uniform set of rules governing the practice and
procedures to be used in the federal district court system. In 1938, Congress
adopted and passed the FRCP. The FRCP allow for notice pleadings to
ease the technicalities associated with fact pleadings and to insure that
disputes are setiled on the merits of the litigants' claims.9 However, the
framers of the FRCP, aware of the many potential areas for abusive tactics
by litigants using notice pleadings, drafted rule 11 to address some of those
concerns. 0
The original rule, passed in 1938, remained unchanged for the first 45
years of its existence." From its inception, rule 11 attempted to impose
control over attorneys who signed pleadings which lacked solid ground or
were filed for purposes of delay. 12 Despite these goals, rule 11 was used
3
sparingly in its early years.'
In 1983, amendments to rule 11 transformed this previously ineffective
rule into a powerful mechanism for sanctioning an attorney who files
meritless claims and defenses.14 The intent of the amendment was to curb
the abuses of unscrupulous attorneys and, as stated in the advisory committee notes, to encourage the courts to control attorneys' behavior in the
court system.' 5 The rule as amended was not intended to have a "chilling
effect" on the litigants.' 6 This "chilling effect" refers to the apprehensiveness
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 2450.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934).
5 C. WuiOHT & A. MILLER, FEDEAL PRACTICE AND
5A id. § 1331.
See FED. R. Cxv. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 11.

PROCEDURE §

1202 (1990).

13. Nelken, Sanction.; Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1314 (1986).

14. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment (recognizing
the ineffectiveness of rule 11 as originally promulgated: "Experience shows that in practice

Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses.").
15. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11. The advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment state:
"The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of the courts to impose sanctions ...
by emphasizing the resp ,nsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the

imposition of sanctions." Id. advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment.
16. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment.
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of attorneys to take questionable claims to court in fear of potential
sanctions.1 7 In a short time, the amendment strengthened the rule so as to
give federal judges an incentive to apply it."8 In fact, over 200 cases
concerning rule 11 sanctions were reported during the first two years following the amendment.' 9
The 1938 Federal Rules also promulgated rule 41(a)(1) of the FRCP, the
rule on dismissal by the filing litigant. 2° Rule 41(a) was intended to limit
the right of dismissal by the litigant's unilateral act to the earliest stages of
21
the litigation process, before the adverse party filed a responsive pleading.
In 1946, rule 41 was amended to allow a dismissal by notice only if the
notice was filed before the adverse party filed a responsive pleading or a
motion for summary judgment.?
Prior to the promulgation of the FRCP, various states dictated federal
procedures, rules which often allowed dismissals or non-suits as a matter
of right, up to the entry of the verdict.23 Such state rules allowed unscrupulous attorneys the opportunity to use abusive tactics such as filing nuisance
suits aimed only at achieving a valuable settlement out of an empty claim.
A major goal of rule 41(a)'s creators was eradication of these abusive
tactics. 24
The major emphasis of rule 41(a)(1) and rule 11 remains curbing abuses
of the judicial system. These rules were promulgated under the premise that
litigants must be able to operate under the FRCP so as to formulate an
appropriate legal strategy while at the same time protecting the interests of
their opponents from harassment and embarrassment.
I.

How Rule 11 and Rule 41(a) Work in Conjunction
2

The Second Circuit, in Johnson Chemical Co. v. Home Care Products,
addressed the question of possible rule 11 sanctions on a claim brought but
properly dismissed under rule 41(a)(1). In Johnson Chemical, a distributor
brought an action seeking injunctive relief against a manufacturer who had
threatened to liquidate products made by the manufacturer but packaged
in containers supplied by the distributor. The threatened liquidation was
17. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
18. Vairo, supra note 2.
19. Nelken, supra note 13, at 1314.
20. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDE.RAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2361 (1971).
21. Id.§ 2362.
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41 advisory committee notes to the 1946 amendment.
23. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2363 (1971). Until
the adoption of FRCP, the Conformity Act required the federal courts to apply the procedural
laws of the states in which they sat.
24. See American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Institute and the Federal Rules,
Cleveland, Ohio 350 (1938) (rule 41(a)(1) was intended to eliminate "the annoying of a
defendant by being summoned to court in successive actions and then if no settlement is
arrived at, requiring him to permit the action to be dismissed and another one commenced at
leisure.").
25. 823 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1987).
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based on past due payments from the distributor to the manufacturer. The
court granted the injunction, and the distributor posted a bond to secure
the manufacturer's claim. After the distributor received the goods wrapped
in their packaging, the distributor filed a notice of voluntary dismissal,
under rule 41(a)(1), of its claim against the manufacturer.
The manufacturer promptly filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and
petitioned the court to sanction the distributor under rule 11. The manufacturer's argument was based upon the theory that the distributor used the
authority of the court for an "improper purpose." 26 The district court
granted both of the manufacturer's requests, and the distributor appealed.
The Second Circuit held that once the distributor had dismissed the claim
under rule 41(a)(1), the district court lost all jurisdiction over the action. 27
Thereafter, the Second Circuit vacated the rule 11 sanctions.
Johnson Chemical thus held that once a proper notice of dismissal has
been filed under rule 41(a)(1), the claim being dismissed never existed.
Voluntary dismissal means a total divestment of jurisdiction from the court
to hear the motion for sanctions.3 Such an action, therefore, would render
29
the court powerless to impose sanctions thereafter.
The majority view among the federal circuit courts concerning the propriety of rule 11 sanctions in such an instance rejects the reasoning of
Johnson Chemical.30 This majority view, as stated in Szabo Food Service,
Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,31 provides that the violation of rule 11 is complete
when the paper or pleading is filed with the federal court clerk, and
voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(1) will not expunge the rule 11 viola32
tion.
In Szabo Food Service, the plaintiffs, a minority company, filed a complaint alleging racial discrimination on the grounds that they had not been
awarded a service contract on which they had recently bid. The plaintiffs
joined as defendants the victorious bidder, the Canteen Corporation, along
with the party who had invited the bids and eventually decided which bid
to accept. Subsequently, the plaintiffs dropped the suit by filing a notice
of voluntary dismissal pursuant to rule 41(a)(1).
In a subsequent proceeding, it became apparent to Canteen Corp. that
Szabo Food Service knew, before filing the original action, that Canteen
Corp. was also a minority participant bidding on the contract. Because
Canteen Corp. was a minority participant, they would have been excluded
from potential liability in a race discrimination action.33 Canteen Corp.
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id. at 31; see ak1o Santiago v. Victim Servs. Agency, 753 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
28. Johnson Chem., 823 F.2d at 31.
29. Id.
30. See Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600 (lst Cir. 1988); Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901
(1988); Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 121 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1941).
31. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
32. Id. at 1077.
33. Id. at 1076.
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subsequently filed a motion for sanctions under rule 11. The district court
denied the motion.
On appeal, Szabo Food Service argued that the voluntary dismissal had
divested the district court of jurisdiction to hear the rule 11 motion.14 The
Seventh Circuit, however, found that jurisdiction is an "all-purpose" word
signifying adjudicatory power. The court held that a violation of rule 11 is
completed when a party or its attorney files the complaint. 5 Pleading that
a court lacks jurisdiction to describe its powers does not mean that the
6
court may not hear ancillary claims concerning the original action.1
The Court in Szabo likened the award of fees under rule 11 to sanctions
for contempt of court. The Seventh Circuit's analogy noted that the "award
under Rule 11 is a sanction for violating a rule of the court. 3 7 As such, a
party cannot absolve itself of responsibility by dismissing the suit.3 8 This
holding shows that the two rules, rule 41(a)(1) and rule 11, can work in
conjunction with one another and are not mutually exclusive. The exercise
of the former will not divest a court of the power to use the latter.
III.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Cooter & Gell

The controversy over whether rule 11 and rule 41(a)(1) are mutually
exclusive came before the Supreme Court in the case of Cooter & Gell v.
39
Hartmarx,
approximately two years after the Szabo Food Service and
Johnson Chemical cases. In Cooter & Gell, Danik, Inc., a customer of
Hartmarx Corp., owned and operated a number of clothing stores in the
Washington, D.C. area. Intercontinental Apparel, a subsidiary of Hartmarx,
brought a breach of contract action against Danik in federal district court.
Danik, represented by the law firm of Cooter & Gell, responded by filing
a counterclaim alleging various violations of antitrust laws.
During litigation, Danik filed two additional antitrust complaints against
Hartmarx and two of its subsidiaries. One of these complaints alleged a
nationwide conspiracy to eliminate competition through an exclusive retail
agent policy. In defense of these latter claims, Danik filed three affidavits
setting forth the pre-filing research that supported the complaint. Because
of this subsequent complaint, Hartmarx moved for sanctions under rule 11.
Subsequently, Danik filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to rule
41(a)(1) on the latter claims. However, before the dismissal became effective,
the district court heard oral argument on the defendant's rule 11 motion.
Three years after hearing the litigants' arguments, the district court granted
Hartmarx's motion for rule 11 sanctions, holding that Danik's pre-filing
inquiry was grossly inadequate.40 As allowed by rule 11, the district court
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.at 1077.
Id.
Id.at 1079.
Id.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 120 F.R.D. 439, 442 (D.D.C. 1988).
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imposed sanctions against both the representative law firm of Cooter & Gell
and the plaintiff', Danik. 41 Danik and Cooter & Gell both appealed the
award of sanctions, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed.:2 Only the law firm of Cooter & Gell petitioned for further
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, Cooter & Gell argued that the court's jurisdiction to hear the rule 11 motion was terminated by the notice to dismiss.
The Court held that the district court's jurisdiction was invoked by the
filing of the underlying complaint.43 Filing an action in federal court gives
the court the ability to hear both the merits of the action and the motion
for rule 11 sanctions arising from that filing. 44 In essence, the Court adopted
the Szabo Food Service holding that rule 41(a)(1) could not divest the court
of jurisdiction to consider a motion for sanctions under rule 11.
The Court reasoned that in order to give rule 11 its fully intended use of
mandatory sanctions once a violation of the rule had been perpetrated, a
court must have the authority to consider whether there had been such a
violation, regardles,; of the dismissal of the underlying action. 45 Nothing in
the language of the FRCP indicates that a district court's authority to
impose sanctions is severed by a dismissal filed by the litigant."
The Court found strength in its decision from the well-established principle
that the federal courts have the ability to consider collateral issues after an
action is no longer pending. 47 The Court noted certain circuit court decisions
which analogize rule 11 sanctions to contempt of court sanctions; both types
of sanctions are intrinsically collateral issues apart from the proceedings at
issue. 4" Regarding rule 11, the questions to be answered by the court are
whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, what sanction
would be appropriate. 49 These determinations have little to do with whether
the action between the litigants is still pending. Accordingly, the Court held
that rule 11 is a collateral issue to the actual dispute between the litigants,
and a motion for sanctions under rule 11 may be heard regardless of
whether the action had been properly dismissed. 0
The Court also looked to the language of rule 41(a)(1) and found no
codified policy of allowing litigants the right to file "baseless papers." The
Court reasoned that both rule 41(a)(1) and rule 11 were intended to curb
abuses of the judicial system by litigants and were, therefore, completely

41. Id. at 445.
42. Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
43. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. 2455.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also FED. R. Cirv. P. 41(a).
47. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2455.
48. Id. at 2456; see also Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75 (1975) (quoting Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911) (a criminal contempt charge is likewise
"a separate and independent proceeding at law" that is not part of the original action).
49. Adamson v. Bovien, 855 F.2d 688, 672 (10th Cir. 1988).
50. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2456.
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by dismissing the action
compatible.51 Allowing a litigant to avoid sanctions
52
would contravene the purpose of both rules.
In a lone dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority had erred by
failing to read the FRCP within the limited mandate of the Rules Enabling
Act. 3 According to Justice Stevens, the majority had "eviscerated" rule
41(a)(1) by focusing solely on rule 11, and thus created a generalized federal
common law of malicious prosecution.5 Justice Stevens' dissent focuses on
the concept of fairness intended by the framers of the FRCP. He argued
that rule 41(a)(1) was drafted so that litigants could file complaints and
preserve their rights under a statute of limitations 55and then reconsider their
position prior to the commencement of litigation.
Further, Stevens found that a complaint, once properly withdrawn, did
not remain an appropriate area for additional investigation by the federal
courts.m In Stevens' view, the holding of the majority will only encourage
the filing of sanctions motions and discourage voluntary dismissal.5 7 Therefore, in Stevens' opinion, sanctioning a party after dismissal cannot be
justified by the goal of the FRCP "to secure the just, speedy, and inex58
pensive determination of every action."
IV. Analysis of the Court's Holding Regarding
the Interaction of Rule 11 and Rule 41(a)(1)
A basic rule of statutory interpretation requires ambiguous statutes to be
read narrowly. The Federal Rules are accompanied by advisory committee
notes which give the reader the history and legislative intent behind the
individual rules and their subsequent amendments. These notes are included
with the rules to give an interpreter guidance on the proper usage of the
rules.
From a strictly textual standpoint, the Court properly found that rule
41(a)(1) did not impede a trial court's ability to apply rule 11. In analyzing
the compatibility of rule 11 and rule 41(a)(1), the Court looked at the
individual rules and found that neither directly addresses the other.5 9 The
FRCP does not expressly mandate that the rules be mutually exclusive.
Thus, the rules should be read so they can be applied together.

51. Id. at 2457. The Court noted how the rules were compatible by holding that "[b]aseless
filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with
needless expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the action, the harm
triggering Rule ll's concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a litigant who violates Rule 11
merits sanctions even after a dismissal." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2464.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 2463.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2464.
Id. (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 1).
Id. at 2456.
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Each rule in the FRCP concerns a different part of federal district court
procedure. The Federal Rules should be read so that they intertwine with
one another and mesh like finely crafted gears; the full interpretation of
one rule should not negate or cut short another. Like a well-written manuscript, the rules should logically flow together and give trial courts a
cohesive network of guidelines to govern procedures in their courts.
Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted
a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the
court are well-grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed for any
improper purpose.6 An attorney who signs a paper so filed, without such
a substantial belief, "shall" be penalized by an appropriate sanction. 6' The
language of the statute is mandatory. The rule does not say "subject to
Rule 41(a)(1)" or "unless the court has lost jurisdiction." No intrinsic
competing interests exist between rule 41(a)(1) and rule 11 to make the
application of both rules to the same claim incompatible. On the issue of
statutory interpretation, the Court's decision deserves high marks.
The Court's decision was no real surprise, as it was consistent with the
weight of the circuit courts' previous decisions. 62 Cooter & Gell gave the
Court the opportunity to explore rule 11 and its foundation and address
the difficult question concerning when rule 11 can be applied. The Court
emphatically held that an attorney's abusive conduct triggers the rule's
applicability and, once unleashed, nothing can call it back. 63 The Court
voices a strong stance against abuses of the judicial system and looks to
eradicate the frivolous lawsuit from the federal court system.
Strong policy reasons mandate the Court taking similar steps to protect
the judicial process in the future. Protection against needless delays of the
court system and backlogs of the federal dockets remains foremost. The
litigation explosion of the 1980s has put a severe strain on the federal courts'
once abundant resources.6 The federal docket contains no room for wasted
time caused by dilatory pleadings and frivolous lawsuits. Judicial economy
demands protection. A litigant attempting to buy time should have taken
the necessary steps to prepare his case prior to filing. Additionally, the
federal courts have a near exclusive claim to jurisdiction over some of the
fastest growing areas in the law - bankruptcy and patent law. This new
strain on the federal courts cannot tolerate the competition of frivolous
pleadings, motions, or lawsuits.
Second, litigation represents a public display of an individual's problems.
A defendant who has been forced into court is subject to embarrassment
and the social stigma of being a wrongdoer. The needless abuse of a

60. See FED. R. Cv. P. 11.
61. Id.
62. See Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988); Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987); Greenburg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882
(9th Cir. 1987).
63. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2455.
64. 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (1990).
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defendant's peace of mind constitutes an act that the judiciary cannot
permit. Corporations and businesses are not immune from the negative
stigma of being identified as a defendant in a lawsuit. Frivolous lawsuits
are costly and, more importantly, time consuming for those involved.
Rule 11 was forged so that federal judges could wield a tool to deter and
combat the potential problems associated with unsound pleadings, insuring
a speedy resolution to pending claims and discouraging improvident actions
from being filed in the federal court system. The rule was promulgated to
safeguard against "frivolous" lawsuits. 61
Some commentators side with the Second Circuit's opinion in Johnson
Chemical as being the proper analysis for dealing with the use of rule 11
after a litigant has voluntarily dismissed an action.66 These commentators
believe that litigants should not generally be punished if they have taken
the desirable course of discontinuing an action. The opinion, however, does
not take into consideration the potential costs of exhaustive legal research
in answering a petition or the emotional trauma of being forced into the
legal arena. The harm has already been done to the litigant's opponent.
Why should a party successfully harassing another through the filing of a
lawsuit be exempt from punishment for abusing the legal system and his
opponent?
Cooter & Gell mandates federal courts to use rule 11. Federal courts will
undoubtedly continue to apply the rule in ever increasing numbers. However,
because rule 11 is so widely publicized, it is easy to lose sight of the fact
that the scope of the rule is actually quite limited. The rule only applies to
conduct relating to the signing of pleadings, motions, or other papers that
are not well grounded in fact. 67 No other behavior falls under the sanctions
of rule 11. The Court properly analyzed Cooter & Gell and determined its
outcome in a manner that accords with the stated purpose of rule 11 the eradication of the frivolous law suit.
V. Standard of Review
Because of the stigma attached to sanctions under rule 11, many sanctioned attorneys will undoubtedly appeal the penalty. An appellate court
remains a court of review. Its purpose is not to retry the case, but to
scrutinize the record of the trial court to determine whether reversible error
has been committed. 68 In general, appellate courts are compelled to review
lower courts' holdings with varying degrees of deference according to the
finding on appeal. The particular degree of deference to be accorded a trial
court's decision is called standard of review.
For purposes of standard of review, decisions by trial judges are traditionally divided into three categories: questions of fact, questions of law,
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
66. Vairo, supra note 2.
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
68. M. GREEN, BAsIc Cwi PROCEDURE 225 (1972).
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and matters of discretion. 69 Choosing the appropriate standard of appellate
review for a specific finding of the lower court is dictated by a long history
of appellate practice. 70
A.

Questions of Law: De Novo Review

The reviewing court may pay little deference to a trial judge's finding on
a question of law. The reviewing court will open the trial court record and
review the evidence as if the appellate court had been present at trial. 71 This
de novo review is justified because the appellate court is, like the trial
judge, well schooled in the law and can make legal determinations by simply
72
applying the blackletter law to the previously determined facts of the case.
B. Questions of Fact: Clearly Erroneous Review
On findings of fact, the appellate court gives great deference to a fact
finder's ability to determine the necessary background behind legal conclusions. The appellate court can reverse the lower court's findings of fact
only if the findings are found to be clearly erroneous. 73 This high degree
of deference is premised on the trial court's ability to observe and judge
the demeanor of testifying witnesses on the stand - something the appellate
74
court is unable to do.
C. DeterminationsLeft to the Trial Court: Abuse of Discretion Review
The abuse of discretion standard is used where certain issues have traditionally been left to the trial judges to determine. Many of these determinations are procedural in nature. Such decisions have been left to the trial
judge's discretion because the trial judge is in the best position to make the
determination. In making their decisions, trial judges may use their discretion, which is formulated by hearing pertinent evidence produced at trial.7 5
This standard pay,; enormous deference to the trial judge. On appeal, the
reviewing court may overturn a trial judge's discretionary determination
only if it is found to be arbitrary or abusive in light of the surrounding
76
circumstances.
69. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557 (1988).
70. Id.
71. J. LANDERS, J. MARTiN & S. YEAZ=L, CIvIi PROCEDURE 878 (1988).
72. J. FRiL= TfLr, M. KANE, & A. M=Rn, CivL PROCEDURE 600-01 (1985).
73. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a). The clearly erroneous standard of review is codified in rule
52(a), which states in p-rtinent part: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Id.
74. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
Id.
75. Keeth Gas Co. v. Jackson Creek Cattle Co., 91 N.M. 87, 570 P.2d 918, 921 (1977).
76. Saunderson v. Saunderson, 379 So. 2d 91, 92 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
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VI.

Review of Rule 11 Sanctions

Rule 11 presents a special problem to a reviewing court. Because of the
nature of the rule, appellate review of orders imposing sanctions under rule
11 may require a number of separate inquiries.n That is, reviewing a rule
11 sanction encompasses all three of the above mentioned standards. The
court must consider factual questions to determine the factual basis for the
pleading and to check on the pre-filing investigation of the attorney. 78 Legal
issues are present in determining whether the attorney's behavior constitutes
a rule 11 violation. 79 Additionally, in affixing an "appropriate sanction,"
the trial judge must use his own discretion. s0
In determining the appropriate set of standards to be applied in rule 11
sanction review, the circuit courts have been inconsistent. All circuits agree,
however, on how an appellate court should review the lower court's selection
of sanctions. 8' This review should be abuse of discretion. The language of
the rule explicitly provides for the application of this standard. 2 Beyond
this question of how to gauge the "appropriate sanction," the circuits have
applied various combinations of standards in reviewing the other facets of
the rule. Prior to Cooter & Gell, the circuit courts used three methods to
review rule 11 orders: a two-tiered approach, a three-tiered approach, and
the use of a unitary standard.
A.

The Circuit Courts' Applications of Review to Rule 11
1. Two-Tiered Approach

The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in Westmoreland v. CBS,
Inc.,83 applied the abuse of discretion standard in determining whether the
filing had a sufficient factual basis or was imposed for an improper purpose,
but applied the de novo standard to determine whether the pleading or
motion was legally sufficient.84 In Westmoreland, a party to a civil action
filed a petition in district court seeking to hold a non-party witness in
contempt for refusing to consent to a videotaped deposition. The non-party
witness petitioned the court for sanctions under rule 11 on the grounds that
the litigant should have moved under the discovery rules of FRCP to compel
the witness to attend the deposition. The district court refused the motion
for sanctions, and the non-party witness appealed.
77. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2458.
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes. "The [District] [C]ourt, however,
retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion
to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted."
Id. (emphasis added).
83. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1174-75.
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The D.C. Circuit found the lower court in error for not awarding the
non-party witness attorney's fees. 5 Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate
because of the groundless motion filed by the party wishing to videotape
the deposition.16 On review, it was held that factual determinations must be
accorded wide discretion because the district court had "tasted the flavor"
of the litigation and was in the best position to make those types of
determinations.Y The court went on to hold that a determination of whether
the pleading or motion is legally sufficient involves a question of law and
therefore receives de novo review. 8
2. Three-Tiered Approach
Two circuit courts use a three-tiered approach to review rule 11 sanctions. 9
This approach reviews historical facts under the clearly erroneous standard,
the legal determination of whether rule 11 has been violated under a de
novo standard, and the choice of sanctions under an abuse of discretion
standard.9 In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,91 the supporters of a city
councilman brought an action against the City of Los Angeles, claiming
that a recall election violated the Voting Rights Act. 9 Proponents of the
recall intervened, moved to dismiss the complaint, and demanded sanctions
under rule 11. The district court granted the proponents' motions and appeal
was taken.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that it was improper under
the circumstances to impose sanctions under rule 11. 91 In reviewing the
lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit adopted the three-tiered approach
to review rule 1l sanctions2 4 Prior to Zaldivar, the Ninth Circuit had not
interpreted the appropriate standard to apply to rule 11 and, therefore,
chose to remain consistent with the standards applied to traditional appellate
review. 9
3.

Unitary Standard

The majority of the circuits have applied the abuse of discretion standard
across the board to all facets of rule 11.96 For instance, the Fifth Circuit
85. Id. at 1175. As stated in rule 11, attorney fees may be an appropriate sanction.
86. Id. at 1178.
87. Id. at 1174. Note, the court applies "abuse of discretion" to factual findings made by
the lower court and not "clearly erroneous" as is mandated by rule 52(a).
88. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770"F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
89. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828; Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429,
1434 (7th Cir. 1987).
90. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828.
91. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
92. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
93. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 835.
94. Id. at 828.
95. Id. at 828 n.4.
96. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 757-58 (Ist Cir. 1988); Teamsters
Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 848 (1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988)
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in Thomas v. Capitol Security Services,97 held that a unitary standard of
review for rule 11 sanctions, abuse of discretion, should be applied. 98 In
Thomas, a group of employees filed suit against their former employer
claiming title VII 99 violations. At trial, the employees lost, and after they
appealed, the employer petitioned the court for sanctions under rule 11.
The request for sanctions was based in part on the premise that the plaintiffs
had knowingly reached far beyond the scope of title VII. The motion for
sanctions was denied by the district court. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
remanded, demanding that all district court orders, for rule 11 sanctions be
documented by specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.1°°
On a second appeal, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, took a careful
look at the revised rule 11 and at the appropriate standard of review to be
applied. 10' The court noted that the rule did not specify a standard; however,
the court looked to the language of the advisory committee notes and found
°2
a basis to claim that the abuse of discretion standard should be applied.'
The Fifth Circuit found that the determination of a rule 11 motion
involves a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
alleged violation and that the trial judge is in the best position to review
the circumstances and render an informed judgment. 10 3 The Fifth Circuit
decided that the district court must have discretion to effectively regulate
its courtroom.'0 4
VII.

Supreme Court's Determination on Appropriate Standard of Review

The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of appropriate standards
of review for rule 11 in Cooter & Gell when it sided with the majority of
the circuit courts holding that the appropriate standard to be applied, across
the board, is abuse of discretion. 05 The Court noted that rule 11 uniquely
presents all aspects of review in that it requires factual and legal determinations and, of course, the discretionary matter of the amount of sanction
to be levied.' °6 In its analysis of standard of review, the Court began by
affirming the premise that rule 11 has left the amount of sanctions to be

(en banc); Century Prods. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1988); Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668,
673 (10th Cir. 1988); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060
(4th Cir. 1986).
97. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 872.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). In Thomas, the complaint specified sexual and
racial discrimination in all aspects of their employment relationship with their employer.
100. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987).
101. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
102. Id. at 872.
103. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 873.
104. Id. at 872.
105. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2463.
106. Id. at 2457.
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awarded to the trial court's discretion. By using the term "appropriate"
sanctions, rule 11 itself suggests that the district court is authorized to
exercise its own discretion. ° 7 The Court then moved to determine how the
circuit courts had reviewed rule 11 findings of fact made by trial courts.
Rule 52(a) mandates the appellate courts to uphold the district courts'
findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous." "In practice, the 'clearly
erroneous' standard requires the appellate court to uphold any district court
08
determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions."'
The Court found that when an appellate court reviews a district court's
factual findings, "the abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards
are indistinguishable."'' 9 That is, "a court of appeals would be justified in
concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual
finding only if the finding was clearly erroneous.""' 0 Effectively, the Court
equated clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion.
Finally, the Court dealt with the sole determination of how to review the
issue of the rule's legal determination - whether a rule 11 violation has
occurred. A district court's legal determination of a rule 11 violation requires
consideration of ,ssues "rooted in factual determination.""' The Court
concluded that a district court, being familiar with the issues and litigants,
is in a better position than the court of appeals to gather the pertinent facts
and apply "the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by rule 1.11 "12
Because the legal conclusions of rule 11 are so fact-specific, the Court held
that the reviewing court must pay deference to the district court's decision." 3
The Court relied heavily on Pierce v. Underwood"14 in determining that
the trial court should receive deference on its legal conclusions. In Pierce,
the Court held that a district court's legal determination under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA)1 5 should be reviewed by an abuse of discretion
standard." 6 Similar to rule 11, the EAJA requires the trial court to make
legal determinations that are based on findings of fact made by the trial
court.

117

Pierce found two factors of paramount importance in arriving at its
decision. First, the judicial actor deserved deference because he was better
positioned than the appellate court to make the necessary determination
regarding whether a violation of the statute had taken place." 8 In the EAJA,
the government must be "substantially justified" in its position as a litigant

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 2458.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2459.

Id.
Id. at 2460.
487 U.S. 552 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982).
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561.
Cooler & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459.
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560.
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or the adverse party will receive attorney's fees for being needlessly forced
into court." 9 Whether a legal position is "substantially justified" depends
upon factual determinations that the trial judge is in the best position to
make. 20 Whether "a district court's ruling that a litigant's position is
factually well grounded and legally tenable for rule 11 purposes is similarly
12
fact-specific.'

'

A rule 11 legal conclusion is based wholly on an intricate factual determination. Review of legal issues under a de novo standard would require
the court of appeals to spend needless time investigating a fact pattern
previously determined.lu
Second, Pierce found the abuse of discretion standard gave the trial court
needed flexibility in resolving questions that involved special and narrow
facts that resisted generalization.l2 The question in EAJA of whether the
government has taken a "substantially justified" position requires the finding of unique facts that can not be generalized due to the various positions
a litigant may take in the myriad of actions available in the federal court
system.l 24 Similarly, the Cooter & Gell Court found that the legal issues
involved in determining whether an attorney had violated rule 11 likewise
involve "fact intensive, close calls."u
The Court's final justification for adopting a unitary abuse of discretion
standard to rule 11 review rested on policy considerations. Rule 11's policy
goal of deterrence would best be served by deference to the judicial actor
who is best acquainted with the local Bar's practices. 26 Such deference, the
Court noted, would enhance the trial court's ability to control the litigants
before them. 27
Thus, the Supreme Court held that abuse of discretion is the appropriate
method of review for sanctions under rule 11.128 The district court may have
insight not conveyed by the record into such matters as importance of
particular evidence or whether critical facts could have been verified by the
attorney. 29 Judicial economy and common sense were the backbone of the
Court's decision.
VIII. Analysis of the Court's Holding Regarding Standard of Review
Despite its name, the abuse of discretion standard remains a wide-open
area for possible misuses. Abuse of discretion accords the lower court's
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982).
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560.
Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460.
Id.
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561-62.
Id.
Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2461.
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560.
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decision an unusual amount of insulation from appellate review. 30 Thus,
abuse of discretion becomes a review-restraining concept.' Abuse of discretion "gives the trial judge a right to be wrong without incurring reversal."'' 2 Herein lies its dangers.
Appellate review of district court holdings remains an extremely important
part of our legal ,ystem. One reason for review is that it provides checks
on the trial court's decision making process. Allowing total deference to
the trial court's decision making process would effectively remove the check
traditionally held by the reviewing courts.
For the sake of judicial economy, Cooter & Gell is a godsend because
reviewing de novo a fact-specific legal conclusion is extremely time consuming for the appellate courts. The federal courts simply do not have the
resources to spend time researching facts that have previously been decided. 33 Judicial economy remains a valid interest of the federal court
system. However, judicial economy is not sufficient in and of itself to be
the sole basis for the court to turn its back on years of precedent. Judicial
economy, while a factor to consider, should be accompanied by other valid
interests.
Moreover, certain types of claims may become prey to rule 11 sanctions
by an unaccomnodating judge. Human nature requires an individual to be
opinionated and have preconceived notions on certain issues. Abuse of
discretion demands that the trial judge's decision be paid an enormous
amount of deference by the reviewing court. This deference becomes power
in the judge's hand, and, to a certain extent, that power remains unchecked.
However, along with power comes responsibility. A trial judge must make
an enormous number of decisions while sitting on the bench. Many of those
decisions are "gut feelings," such as whether certain evidence touted by a
party is relevant to the issues actually being litigated. Trial courts are
entrusted to apply the law in a just manner and to make decisions based
on legal principles, not personal feelings. On one hand, rule I1 can be a
tool to control litigants in a district court; however, the rule was never
intended to eradicate unfavored claims.
The trial judge could wield this new power to give rule 11 the "chilling
effect" that concerned the advisory committee. Now, the question exists
whether there is a sufficient check on the trial judges or whether they have
been given too much deference. The Cooter & Geli holding effectively takes
a step of review away from litigants sanctioned under rule I1 and removes
a sufficient check on the trial court. Too much deference is just as dangerous
as too little deference. The power of rule 11 that is given to the trial judge
through the Cooter & Gell decision should be used in a proper and forthright
manner.
130. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRtcusE
L. REv. 635, 637 (1971).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Cooter & GelI, 110 S.Ct. at 2460.
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Another area of concern in Cooter & Gell lies in the Court's comment
that seems to merge the abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards.'3 When the trial court is the fact finder, its determinations are to
be paid the highest deference - the clearly erroneous standard. When the
trial court makes decisions based on discretion, it has certain boundaries
that it cannot cross without being reversed.
Clear error and abuse of discretion have arbitrary boundaries. The reviewing court establishes those boundaries by interpreting the definitions of
the standards. "Abuse of discretion" will not be applied with the exact
same zeal in all of the federal circuit courts. Similarly, it is very possible
that standards of review will vary with differing fact patterns of individual
cases presented in the same court. Because these "standards" have somewhat
flexible definitions, the Court can find some backing for selecting the word
"indistinguishable" in describing the comparison of "abuse" and "clear
error."
Clear error has been described as that which shocks the judicial conscience. 35 However, clear error is seemingly treated with less deference when
the findings of fact are made by the trial judge as opposed to when the
same findings are made by a jury. 3 6 It might be this broad definition of
"clear error" that allows the Court to equate the standards. Abuse of
discretion requires high deference to the trial court's decisions; however,
"abuse" does not equal "clearly erroneous."
IX. Conclusion
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in an attempt to
give a fair, just, and speedy determination of each action brought in federal
court. A basic premise underlying the rules is to protect litigants while
allocating a necessary amount of docket time to reach the correct result.
To carry out these goals, the drafters placed necessary safeguards in the
rules to control litigants' behavior while their claims are being tried.
Rule 41(a) and rule 11 are designed to control litigants by limiting their
ability to withdraw from the actions brought and to deter them from
bringing frivolous claims. The rules do not state that they are mutually
exclusive. Moreover, rule 11 is not expressly limited by rule 41(a). Each
time litigants bring claims, they also grant the court jurisdiction to hear a
rule 11 motion brought by their opponents. Rule 11 achieves its intended
purpose by allo'wing the court to sanction attorneys who bring frivolous
lawsuits. Allowing a litigant to avoid sanctions by dismissing an action,
even if dismissed properly under rule 41(a), would allow abuse of the court
system. Permitting this "out" for a litigant would go directly against the
letter and spirit of the FRCP.
The standard of review topic is rarely publicized. However, it remains an
area of appellate procedure that most legal professionals know and under134. Id. at 2458.
135. State v. Roth, 471 A.2d 370, 386 (N.J. 1984).
136. M. GREEN, BASIc Crvu, PROCEDURE 249 (1972).
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stand. Most applications of the various standards find their genesis in the
common law. ]road areas of fact, law, and tradition filter appealed pleas
into the different: categories of review allowed by the appellate courts.
Consistency has been a hallmark of the review process. Cooter & Gell
displaced tradition and confined review of differing categories to a single,
unitary standard, and, in doing so, gave the trial judge a powerful tool to
control the courtroom. This type of unchecked power can be extremely
dangerous in the wrong hands. The granting of such power is accompanied
by a tremendous amount of responsibility which should guide an evenhanded
approach to the use of rule 11.
Michael R. Annis
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